The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist by Marcus, Russell
 THEORIA 30/3 (2015): 415-429
The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist
Russell Marcus
Received: 01/07/2014 
Final Version: 30/04/2015
BIBLID 0495-4548(2015)30:3p.415-429 
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.12009
ABSTRACT: The debate over whether we should believe that mathematical objects exist quickly leads to the question 
of how to determine what we should believe to exist. Indispensabilists claim that we should believe in the exist-
ence of mathematical objects because of their ineliminable roles in scientific theory. Eleatics argue that only ob-
jects with causal properties exist. Mark Colyvan’s recent defenses of Quine’s indispensability argument present 
an intriguing attempt to provide reasons to favor the indispensabilist’s criterion against some contemporary 
eleatics. I show that Colyvan’s argument is not decisive against the eleatic and then sketch a way to capture 
some of the important intuitions behind both views.
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RESUMEN: El debate sobre si deberíamos creer en la existencia de los objetos matemáticos conduce rápidamente a la 
cuestión de cómo determinar lo que deberíamos creer que existe. Los indispensabilistas declaran que debería-
mos creer en la existencia de los objetos matemáticos por sus funciones ineliminables en la teoría científica. Los 
eleáticos argumentan que sólo existen los objetos que tienen propiedades causales. La defensa reciente de Mark 
Colyvan del argumento de la indispensabilidad de Quine representa un interesante intento de proporcionar ra-
zones a favor del criterio indispensabilista, en contra de algunos eleáticos contemporáneos. Mostraré que el ar-
gumento de Colyvan en contra de los eleáticos no es decisivo y esbozaré a continuación una manera de capturar 
algunas de las importantes intuiciones que se encuentran tras ambos puntos de vista.
Palabras clave: argumento indispensabilista, principio eleático, platonismo de la autonomía, Mark Colyvan.
1. Introduction
The debate over mathematical realism is old and open.1 W.V. Quine argued that we should 
believe in the existence of mathematical objects because of their indispensable uses in scien-
tific theory. In contrast, philosophers with various motivations have argued for an eleatic 
principle which states, roughly, that only causally-active entities exist. The eleatic principle is 
sometimes invoked by its proponents to deny that we should believe in the existence of math-
ematical objects. So the debate over whether we should believe that mathematical objects ex-
ist can quickly lead to the question of how we should determine what to believe exists.
1  Mathematical realism, or platonism, is sometimes taken as the claim that some mathematical proposi-
tions are non-vacuously true, often called sentence or truth-value realism, and sometimes as the claim 
that some mathematical objects exist, often called object realism. Object realism is the same as sentence 
realism on the assumption of a standard semantics for mathematical sentences (i.e. one for which some 
mathematical sentences are non-vacuously true if and only if some mathematical objects exist). I’ll work 
here with object realism.
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One danger of such a debate is that mathematical platonists, those who believe in the 
existence of mathematical objects, tend to prefer criteria which allow for the existence of 
mathematical objects while mathematical nominalists, those who deny the existence of 
mathematical objects, tend to favor restrictive criteria which eliminate the possibility of 
justifying beliefs in mathematical objects. One challenge in adjudicating between platonists 
and nominalists is to formulate criteria which do not beg the question.
Mark Colyvan defends Quine’s indispensability argument and its criterion for deter-
mining our ontological commitments against contemporary eleatics. One thread of Coly-
van’s argument is promising precisely because it may be seen as independent of the debate 
over mathematical objects. Colyvan provides examples which could show that the eleatic 
principle is unacceptable even when applied to the non-mathematical portions of scientific 
theory.
In this paper, I first introduce the indispensabilist and eleatic positions, framing the de-
bate so that it avoids being question-begging. Then I show that Colyvan’s argument is not 
decisive against the eleatic. While the form of Colyvan’s argument is correct and could in 
principle be used to show the falsity of the eleatic principle, the examples themselves are 
unsuccessful. Parallel considerations from the eleatic also fail to decide the matter, as does 
close examination of the indispensabilist’s main argument against the eleatic, the double-
talk criticism. In the end, I sketch a platonist view of mathematics which, while not en-
tailed by the central arguments of this paper, captures some of the advantages of each side, 
allowing us to maintain both the eleatic’s claim that causal efficacy is central to our beliefs 
about how to understand the ontology of scientific theory and the indispensabilist’s claim 
that some mathematical propositions are true.
2. Quine’s Argument
Quine’s indispensability argument QI proceeds as follows.2
QI1. We should believe only the theory which best accounts for our sense experience.
QI2. Our belief in a theory entails belief in all of its ontological commitments.
QI3. The ontological commitments of any theory are the objects over which that theory 
first-order quantifies.
QI4. The theory which best accounts for our sense experience first-order quantifies over 
mathematical objects.
QIC. We should believe that mathematical objects exist.
QI follows from Quine’s general method for determining the ontological commitments of 
a theory. First, QI1-QI2, we choose a best theory. Then, QI3, we regiment that theory in a 
canonical language of first-order logic with identity. Last, QI4, we examine the domain of 
quantification of the theory to see which objects the theory requires in order to come out 
as true.
2 Quine nowhere presents a detailed indispensability argument, though he alludes to the argument 
throughout much of his work. See Quines 1939, 1948, 1951, 1955, 1958, 1960, 1978, and 1986. Quine 
and Goodman 1947 is a notable exception. QI is my reconstruction of Quine’s argument.
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Quine’s method applies to any theory. Theories which refer to trees, electrons, and 
numbers, and theories which refer to ghosts, caloric, and God, are equally amenable to 
Quine’s procedure. The theory to which QI refers, and which purportedly yields mathe-
matical objects, is designed to account for our sense experiences, including explaining, pre-
dicting, and representing them. In addition to its references to ordinary objects like trees, it 
refers to objects which we cannot, arguably, sense directly, like carbon atoms, and to some 
objects which we cannot sense at all, like sets. Some of the objects posited by my theory are 
constituents of ordinary objects, as carbon atoms constitute portions of trees. Other objects 
to which my theory refers (e.g. mathematical objects) are posited for more formal or tech-
nical reasons.
An often-overlooked virtue of Quine’s argument, one worth keeping in mind, is that it 
obviates worries about access to mathematical objects. Our ontology is not determined by a 
reductionist account of our sense experience. We need not see mathematical objects to be-
lieve that they exist. Rather, our ontology is determined by the construction and interpre-
tation of our theories.
There are a variety of possible negative responses to the Quinean argument. One pos-
sibility is to deny QI4.3 Another possibility is to deny Quine’s method for determining the 
commitments of a theory.
3. The Eleatic Principle
Eleatics like David Armstrong and Jody Azzouni defend an alternative to Quine’s method 
which has its roots in Plato’s Sophist.4 The eleatic principle is notoriously difficult to articu-
late precisely. Armstrong emphasizes both causal activity and spatio-temporal location.
Against the suggestion that the world might contain...such things as possibilities, timeless 
propositions and “abstract” classes, I argued that these latter entities had no causal power; and 
that if they had no power there was no good reason to postulate them (Armstrong 1978b: 46).
The world is nothing but a single spatio-temporal system (Armstrong 1978a: 126).
In response, Oddie 1982 develops counter-examples to these and other expressions of the 
principle which illustrate the difficulty of formulating necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The difficulty is compounded by the eleatics’ reliance on a concept, causation, which has 
puzzled philosophers since at least Hume’s time and remains problematic.5
3 Field 1980 spurred a range of projects denying QI4 by rewriting either mathematical or scientific the-
ory to dispense with quantification over mathematical objects. Burgess and Rosen 1997 elegantly com-
piles many of these dispensabilist strategies. We can easily eliminate quantification over mathematical 
objects from first-order theories of standard science, using a variety of tricks which yield ugly, unwieldy 
theories. So, the Quinean must emphasize the ‘best’ in both QI1 and QI4.
4 “I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but power” (Sophist 247e, 
Cornford translation).
5 One live and salient question concerns the nature of objects related causally: Are they events, facts, fea-
tures, states of affairs, or something else? The eleatic seeks to ground ontology in causation, but ques-
tions of ontology are difficult to answer unless we know what the causal relation relates.
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Despite difficulties formulating a precise eleatic principle, it is not unclear how the 
principle is intended as an alternative to QI regarding whether we should believe in math-
ematical objects. The eleatic claims that we should not believe in mathematical objects, 
even if they are included in our best theory, because they are not causally connected to the 
directly sensible, space-time world. They are mere heuristic devices. “If any entities outside 
the [spatio-temporal] system are postulated, but have no effect on the system, there is no 
compelling reason to postulate them” (Armstrong 1980: 154).6
For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on a paradigmatic formulation of the 
eleatic principle: ‘Only those things which are causally active are real’.7 The eleatic need 
not deny the indispensabilist’s claims, at QI1 and QI2, that we should believe our best 
scientific theory and the posits that it makes. S/he need not deny the holism which un-
derlies those premises nor the naturalism which prompts the argument. Nor need the 
eleatic deny QI4, the claim that mathematics is ineliminable from our best theory. The 
central disagreement between the eleatic and the indispensabilist concerns how we read 
the posits from the theory, QI3. The eleatic claims that to be is to be causally active; our 
theory contains both real posits (e.g. trees, carbon atoms) and merely instrumental ones 
(e.g. the square root of two). The indispensabilist claims, “To be is to be the value of a 
variable” (Quine 1939: 50, and elsewhere), “To call a posit a posit is not to patronize it” 
(Quine 1960: 22), and that any distinction between real and instrumental posits in our 
best theory is arbitrary.
In contrast to the indispensabilist’s latter criticism, the eleatic believes that s/he has a 
principled way of distinguishing between real and instrumental elements of a theory: what-
ever the formulations of our theories require, mathematical objects are causally isolated 
from the rest of the world. Mark Balaguer calls the fact that we are unable to interact with 
mathematical objects the principle of causal isolation, or PCI. The commonsensical PCI is 
an eleatic principle and Balaguer wields it against the indispensability argument, noting the 
tension between QI and eleaticism. “The Quine-Putnam argument should be construed 
as an argument not for platonism or the truth of mathematics but, rather, for the falsity of 
PCI” (Balaguer 1998: 110).
The indispensabilist, embracing mathematical objects, accepts the existence of causally 
isolated entities. The eleatic, unwilling to accept anything causally isolated, rejects math-
ematical objects. The mathematical platonist may find QI convincing. The anti-platonist 
may be convinced by an eleatic principle. The indispensabilist’s appeals to quantification 
over mathematical entities fail to convince the eleatic to abandon instrumentalism about 
them. The eleatic’s appeals to the causal inefficacy of mathematical posits fail to appear rel-
evant to the indispensabilist. Stalemate.
To decide between the two competing positions without begging the question of the 
existence of mathematical objects, we need reasons independent of mathematics to adopt 
either QI3 or an eleatic principle. In the next two sections I will show that recent attempts 
to provide such reasons, on both sides, do not succeed.
6 Eleaticism may be the motivation for recent defenses of so-called easy-road (or weasel) nominalism, the 
claim that we can baldly deny mathematical commitments no matter how mathematics is used in theo-
ries we otherwise believe. See Melia 2000: 474; Leng 2002: 411; and Azzouni 2012.
7 Compare to Oddie 1982: 286; Field 1989: 68; Melia 2000: 474; and Azzouni 2004b: 150.
Theoria 30/3 (2015): 415-429
 The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist 419
4. Colyvan’s Defense of QI
In defense of the indispensability argument, Colyvan argues that we are committed by 
physical theory to non-causal entities which play indispensable explanatory roles. If we ad-
mit non-causal, non-mathematical objects, then the eleatic principle fails independently of 
what we believe about mathematical objects. The door would be open to admit mathemati-
cal objects as well. And, Colyvan argues, there are good reasons to admit non-causal non-
mathematical objects. Thus, according to Colyvan, the principled distinction which sup-
ports the eleatic’s view is wrong.
Colyvan presents three examples.8 In the first example, Colyvan argues that the best 
explanation of light bending around large objects is geometric, rather than causal. “It’s 
not that something causes the light to deviate from its usual path; it’s simply that light 
travels along space-time geodesics and that the curvature of space-time is greater around 
massive objects” (Colyvan 2001: 47-8). Large masses covary with curvatures in space-
time, but it is not clear, on a causal picture, which causes which. Furthermore, according 
to the non-Minkowski vacuum solutions to the Einstein equation, there are empty, yet 
curved space-times. On the causal picture, these curvatures are uncaused, and thus unex-
plained.
Colyvan’s second example concerns the existence of two antipodes in the Earth’s at-
mosphere with exactly the same pressure and temperature at the same time. The causal ex-
planation of this phenomenon, which refers to atmospheric conditions, suffices only to de-
scribe the existence of the antipodes, and does not explain why they inevitably exist. The 
existence of antipodes is guaranteed by a topological theorem. The proof of this theorem 
provides the remainder of the explanation and is non-causal.
Third, Colyvan asks us to consider the Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction. A body in 
motion contracts, relative to an inertial reference frame, in the direction of motion. 
Minkowski’s explanation of this contraction relies on equations in four dimensions, repre-
senting the space-time manifold. Colyvan calls this, “A purely geometric explanation of the 
contraction, featuring such non-causal entities as the Minkowski metric and other geomet-
ric properties of Minkowski space” (Colyvan 2001: 51).
To evaluate Colyvan’s examples, recall that we are looking for non-causal entities 
other than mathematical objects which play an explanatory role. His argument is that since 
we need non-causal non-mathematical elements in our best theory, eleatic principles are 
shown false independently of the contentious mathematical case. If Colyvan’s examples 
were to show only that mathematical elements of our best theory were indispensable, then 
using those examples to choose QI over an eleatic principle would be just like using a bare 
preference for mathematical realism to choose QI over an eleatic principle or a bare disdain 
for mathematical objects to choose an eleatic principle over QI.
Colyvan’s first example, the geodesics, either begs the question or is insufficient. If we 
take the geodesics as pure mathematical objects, Colyvan begs the question by presenting a 
8 These examples play a dual role in Colyvan’s work in defending QI: against the eleatics who deny QI3 
and against the dispensabilists like Hartry Field who deny QI4. My criticisms of Colyvan’s examples 
in this paper apply only to their use against the eleatic and not to their use supporting QI4 against the 
indispensabilist. (Note that the three examples are present in Colyvan 2001, but only the second and 
third are present in Colyvan 1998 in which the problem is framed more aptly for present purposes.)
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geometric object as explanatory. If we take geodesics to be physical entities, then we should 
see them as properties of physical space-time, as opposed to objects of pure geometry. As-
cribing causal properties to mathematical entities may be repugnant, but taking physical 
geometry to have causal relations to physical objects is not. We may naturally see masses as 
causing curvatures in physical space.
Colyvan rejects the causal interpretation. “[A]ny account that permits mass to cause 
the curvature of space-time is unintuitive to say the least” (Colyvan 2001: 48). The unin-
tuitiveness, for Colyvan, may arise from thinking of space-time as abstract, or relationally. 
If we think of it substantivally, the causal explanation is not problematic. Indeed, any non-
causal explanation of the curving geodesics near massive objects would make those curves 
seem entirely accidental. Without massive objects in or near their paths, light rays travel in 
straight lines.
The case of an empty, yet curved, space-time only reinforces the claim that we do not 
need a non-causal, non-mathematical explanation. The curvature of space-time is not an 
event which can be explained in terms of antecedent conditions, say. We can take it, with 
the substantivalist, to be a property of an object or collection of objects: space-time points 
or regions. Or we can take an empty yet curved manifold as a pure geometric object. In nei-
ther case do we need to posit non-causal, non-mathematical objects.
In Colyvan’s second case, the antipodes, we must again make a pure/applied distinc-
tion regarding the topological theorem. The pure mathematical theorem does not guar-
antee that these antipodes have the same temperature and pressure. We need bridge prin-
ciples which apply this theorem to the Earth and its weather patterns. Once we add these 
bridge principles, the proof which guarantees the antipodes may naturally be regarded as 
a causal explanation. For, the bridge principles will refer to causal structures within the 
Earth’s atmosphere and it is these which explain the existence of the antipodes. This expla-
nation will, as Colyvan notes, refer to non-causal entities such as continuous functions and 
spheres, but these are mathematical objects. We are looking for non-causal, yet non-mathe-
matical, elements.
In the third example, the equations which explain contraction are supposed to make 
indispensable reference to non-causal entities: the Minkowski metric and other geometric 
properties of Minkowski space. Geometry, as in the bending-of-light example, can either be 
taken as a purely mathematical theory or as a description of the space-time manifold. In the 
latter case, we again may take space-time substantivally, in which case the geometric expla-
nation of the contraction need not appeal to non-causal elements.9
In the former case, the Lorentz contraction is explained by a combination of math-
ematical objects (the equations which describe the transformations) and physical objects 
(the objects contracted). The equations apply to the physical world and thus explain the 
contraction of a physical body in motion when coupled with bridge principles which ex-
plain their applicability.10
It is a perennially interesting question why mathematical objects are applicable to 
physical theories, as in these cases. Colyvan’s examples may well provide support for the 
 9 For a defense of space-time substantivalism, see Field 1989, Chapter 6.
10  Melia writes similarly: “The Minkowski explanation is a geometric explanation of relativistic effects - 
not a mathematical one” (Melia 2002: 76).
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indispensability argument, as examples supporting QI4.11 But, the indispensability of 
mathematics may be granted by eleatics without weakening their claim against the indis-
pensabilists. The eleatic can claim that scientists use mathematics in order to express facts 
that are not representable without mathematics but that such representations are not sup-
posed to be ontologically serious.
In none of his three cases has Colyvan shown that a non-causal entity, other than a 
mathematical object, plays an essential role in scientific explanation. The eleatic, ex hy-
pothesi, need not show that mathematical entities can be removed from explanations in the 
physical world. Colyvan’s examples fail to establish QI over eleatic principles.
5. Eleaticism, Ideal Theories, and Double-Talk
Let’s turn to the eleatic. Azzouni defends eleaticism by arguing that accepting the indispen-
sability argument would commit us to objects we do not really believe exist. He describes 
instances in which existential quantifications within science proper should be seen as 
merely instrumental. The users of scientific theories are not committed to centers of mass, 
quasi-particles, and mathematical objects. While the latter example is question-begging 
here, the first two examples are worth consideration.
Azzouni 1997b considers a system of two masses connected by a spring, moving in a 
gravitational field. The separate motions of the masses are too complicated to calculate. But 
we can describe the system if we consider it in terms of its center of mass, which is not lo-
cated on the springs, and its reduced mass. Our description of the system refers to its center 
of mass indispensably, according to Azzouni. Yet we know that the center of mass is not a 
real thing, but a merely instrumental posit. Thus Quine’s method does not yield the proper 
results.
Quasi-particles, a second example from Azzouni, are posits used to replace one intrac-
table many-body problem in condensed-matter physics with many one-body problems, us-
ing Fermi Liquid theory. Scientists introduce quasi-particles aware that a fictionalization is 
involved. “[I]t’s not that physicists are failing to ask whether or not they’re committed to 
the entities introduced in this way. They already take themselves not to be so committed. 
That’s why, for example, such ‘particles’ are called quasi-particles” (Azzouni 1997b: 195).
Azzouni urges us to cleave ontological commitment from the existential quantifier 
while maintaining the quantifier’s inferential role within our theories. If we want to reveal 
our commitments within formal scientific theory, we can introduce a predicate to be read 
as ‘is physically real’ and apply it to anything to which we have thick or thin epistemic ac-
cess.12 Observation is paradigmatically thick access. “Any form of epistemic access which is 
robust, can be refined, enables us to track the object..., and which (certain) properties of the 
object itself play a role in how we come to know (possibly other) properties of the object is 
a thick form of epistemic access” (Azzouni 1997a: 477).
We have thin access to objects to which we lack thick access but to which we could, in 
principle, have that access. If we have thin access to an object, we can provide an explana-
11  See fn 8.
12  See Azzouni 2004a: 383; and much of Azzouni 2004b, especially Chapter 4.
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tion of (or excuse clause for) why we lack thick access to it. For example, we can have thin 
access to objects outside our light cone, a distant asteroid, say. Despite our lack of access to 
such an asteroid, we can understand that it can be as real as those in the belt between Mars 
and Jupiter. Azzouni’s defense of eleaticism thus relies on an epistemic argument: we have 
no reason to believe in causally idle entities because we lack thick or thin access to them.13
Colyvan argues that epistemic arguments for an eleatic principle like Azzouni’s are un-
acceptably anthropocentric.14 The charge of anthropocentrism against Azzouni is miti-
gated, to some degree, by his acceptance of thin posits; we need not observe something in 
order to believe that it exists, but we need to have some (presumably causal) story about 
why we lack access: it’s too small or it’s too far away. More recently, Colyvan seems to take 
Azzouni’s epistemic argument to be more promising. “The beauty of Azzouni’s thick and 
thin epistemic access approach is that it does not seem to beg the question against platon-
ism and yet, according to Azzouni, it does rule against ontological commitment to abstract 
entities such as numbers” (Colyvan 2010: 5).
Colyvan is correct that we want a way to determine whether mathematical objects ex-
ist that avoids begging the question. It will not suffice to deny that we should believe that 
mathematical objects exist because we lack access to them; the question only arises because 
of our lack of access. To know if we should take our references to mathematical objects seri-
ously, we require some independent criterion for determining our commitments.
In order to take a non-sensible posit as a real thing, Azzouni claims, we need an expla-
nation of our lack of access to it. Such stories rely on our spatial, temporal, or otherwise 
causal distance from otherwise spatial, temporal, and causally connected objects. Thus, 
while it may appear that Azzouni’s distinctions among posits avoids begging the question 
against the platonist, they are really just refinements of the underlying reasons for those dis-
tinctions: eleaticism.15
Like Colyvan’s cases, Azzouni’s examples are the kinds we are seeking, instances of 
withholding commitments to objects to which serious theories refer.16 Also like Colyvan’s 
examples, these cases are not decisive in favor of an eleatic principle.
It is fairly easy to see how a defender of QI could deny that we should believe in the ex-
istence of centers of mass and quasi-particles. They are introduced as idealizing fictions, to 
make intractable calculations possible. Engineers and experimental physicists require such 
idealizations. But, says the defender of QI, our best theory is not the one we use for practi-
cal purposes. Our best theory will be the one in which we regiment our most sincere, aus-
13  Azzouni actually presents four levels of epistemic access: thick, thin, very thin, and ultra thin. See 
A zzouni 2004: Chapter 6.
14  See Colyvan 2001: §3.2 and Colyvan 1998: §3. See also Colyvan 2010: fn 10, in which he endorses his 
earlier argument.
15  “Azzouni’s main motivation in his earlier articles was the idea that mathematical entities are causally 
idle and therefore idle simpliciter. As I have already mentioned, I think that this idea is still promi-
nent in his current thinking” (Colyvan 2010: 7). Azzouni denies that he needs to formulate excuse 
clauses. “[I]t’s not my job to give a well-motivated and detailed account of what passes for an ex-
cuse. Such excuses issue from science: my job is only to note that fact and indicate its importance...” 
(A zzouni 2012: 962).
16  Recent work on the status of idealizations in science, including the compelling work of Batterman 
2003, further presses the important question of our proper attitude toward such idealizations.
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tere commitments.17 The Quinean will accuse any eleatic of intellectual dishonesty: you 
may not deny that which your theory demands.
This double-talk criticism is essential to QI: if our best theory requires electrons for 
its bound variables, then we should believe in electrons; if it requires sets, then we are com-
mitted to sets. We cannot assert the existence of objects at one moment and then take back 
those assertions at the next, on pain of inconsistency.18
The double-talk criticism appears throughout Quine’s work, as in his response to Car-
nap’s internal/external distinction: Once one has accepted mathematical objects as an in-
ternal matter, one cannot merely dismiss these commitments as the arbitrary, conventional 
adoption of mathematical language. Quine’s response to the Meinongian Wyman in “On 
What There Is,” is also a double-talk criticism; Quine distinguishes between the meaning-
fulness of ‘Pegasus’ and its reference in order to avoid admitting that Pegasus subsists while 
denying that Pegasus exists. Hilary Putnam, defending Quine’s indispensability argument, 
makes the double-talk criticism explicitly. “It is silly to agree that a reason for believing that 
p warrants accepting p in all scientific circumstances, and then to add ‘but even so it is not 
good enough’” (Putnam 1971: 356).
Worries about double-talk bother Quine’s critics as well as his supporters. Field applies 
the double-talk criticism directly to worries about mathematics. “If one just advocates fic-
tionalism about a portion of mathematics, without showing how that part of mathemat-
ics is dispensable in applications, then one is engaging in intellectual doublethink...” (Field 
1980: 2).
Like Colyvan’s claim that scientific theories invoke non-causal, non-mathematical ob-
jects, the double-talk criticism of the eleatic by the indispensabilist is, rightly, a non-ques-
tion-begging methodological principle. Unfortunately, indispensabilists are liable to com-
mit their own sort of double-talk. If the defender of QI responds to examples like A zzouni’s 
by retreating to an ideal best theory, s/he may also be speaking equivocally: we use centers 
of mass (quasi-particles, atoms), but we don’t really believe that they exist.
This point, that the Quinean appeal to ideal theories masks a kind of double-talk, 
should not be underestimated. Criteria for theory choice are notoriously complicated. We 
balance elegance, parsimony, breadth, unification, and simplicity, among other character-
istics. There are no precise formulas for how to weigh these complex, interactive factors. 
We are free to choose among various ways to present a theory: various canonical languages, 
various mathematical axiomatizations, various formulations of the empirical axioms. For 
example, Maxwell’s equations for electromagnetism can be presented in integral or differ-
ential formulations, using a Cartesian basis, vectors, tensors, or even quaternions,19 using 
SI or Gaussian units. The central reason to denigrate a theory which refers to instrumen-
tal posits like centers of mass is precisely because we know that they lack causal powers. 
We see A zzouni’s masses and the spring between them and the space in the middle where 
the center of mass would be located. We say, “There must be a better theory than the one 
which refers to centers of mass because there is nothing there.” It is perilously easy for the 
17  Eleatics may welcome talk of ideal theories in attempting to answer the question of which theories to 
believe fully literally; see e.g. Melia 1995.
18  Not everyone believes that all such double-talk is illicit; e.g. Melia 2000. Insofar as one accepts double-
talk, one rejects QI.
19 See Baker 2001: §2.3.
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indispensabilist to anoint as best those theories which avoid quantification over objects, 
like centers of mass, with no causal powers.
Retreat to an ideal theory thus allows one to import the same kinds of pre-theoretic 
prejudices against which the Quinean brandishes QI. There are limits to the extent to 
which the indispensabilist can import such preferences, as QI itself shows. The defender 
of QI is a reluctant platonist, accepting mathematical objects only because there is no rea-
sonably attractive alternative; most philosophers of mathematics agree that nominalist ver-
sions of standard scientific theories are less attractive than their counterparts which con-
tain mathematical axioms.20 But the defender of QI who appeals to an ideal theory to reject 
counter-examples like Azzouni’s still engages in a kind of double-talk.
Like Colyvan’s examples, the double-talk criticism of eleaticism has the right form: a 
non-question-begging methodological principle which raises serious worries, even if similar 
worries apply to the indispensabilist. Perhaps the indispensabilist can argue convincingly 
that there are non-question-begging reasons to retreat to an ideal theory which quantifies 
over mathematical objects but not instrumental posits. Still, the invocation of the double-
talk criticism is not categorical and eleatics can defend their double-talk by insisting that 
their nominalism is principled rather than arbitrary.
Moreover, in §3 I put aside Oddie’s worries about specifying the eleatic principle pre-
cisely; important distinctions often elude specification. But worries about causation and the 
compatibility of differing formulations of the eleatic principle cannot be put aside forever.
6. Beyond the Eleatic and the Indispensabilist
So despite efforts on both sides, the stalemate between the eleatic and the indispensabilist 
persists.21 Eleatics claim, variously but contentiously, that mathematical terms are meaning-
less, that mathematical sentences are false or merely vacuously true, or that mathematical 
objects do not exist. Indispensabilists claim, implausibly, that considerations arising from 
the construction of empirical theories should compel our belief in abstract objects which 
have no casual connection to ordinary objects. The eleatic focuses on the causal isolation of 
mathematical objects. The indispensabilist emphasizes the fact that our best scientific the-
ories refer to mathematical and physical objects indiscriminately, without anointing some 
references as real and others as merely instrumental. In the remainder of this paper, I’ll 
show how a traditional platonist view, which I call autonomy platonism, embraces impor-
tant aspects of both positions.22
20  See, for example, the debate between the indispensabilist Colyvan and the easy-road nominalist Melia 
in Melia 2000, Colyvan 2002, and Melia 2002. While they disagree on much, they agree on the attrac-
tiveness of the standard versions of scientific theories which include mathematics.
21  “Perhaps we reach a stand off here. Azzouni takes it that it is possible to get all the benefits of the 
mathematical explanations I offer from the notation alone. I am inclined to take the scientific explana-
tions in question literally and see them as cases of mathematics (not just mathematical notation) doing 
the heavy lifting in the cases in question” (Colyvan 2012: 1033).
22  I do not take autonomy platonism to be an entailment of the foregoing arguments of this paper or 
even from the denials of QI and the eleatic principle. I do take it to be the most plausible account of 
mathematics. See Marcus 2015 for more details.
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Autonomy platonism consists of an ontological claim and an epistemological claim. 
The ontological claim, shared with the indispensabilist, is that many mathematical proposi-
tions are true and refer to existing mathematical objects. The epistemological claim is that 
the justification of our mathematical beliefs does not depend on the uses of mathematics in 
empirical science, contrary to QI. So ‘7 + 5 = 12’, ‘a tangent to a sphere in Euclidean space 
intersects the radius of that sphere at a right angle’, and ‘the power set of a set has a cardi-
nality strictly larger than that of the original set’ are all true sentences, referring to math-
ematical objects including numbers, shapes, or sets. They are true regardless of any contin-
gent features of the physical world, no matter what our scientific theories say or how they 
say it.
There are a variety of forms of autonomy platonism, and so a variety of kinds of in-
dependent reasons for believing in the existence of mathematical objects. Some versions 
invoke a contentious cognitive capacity of mathematical intuition, though it is not an es-
sential component.23 Balaguer’s plenitudinous platonism (FBP), for example, grounds our 
knowledge of mathematics in our basic ability to recognize consistency and entailment. On 
Balaguer’s FBP, all consistent mathematical theories truly describe some mathematical do-
main. We can know about mathematical objects merely because we can recognize the con-
sistency or inconsistency of mathematical theories, without appealing to the applications 
of mathematics in science or to mathematical intuition. Most philosophers agree that an 
ability to recognize consistency is not contentious since it is central to any account of our 
knowledge of logic.
I make two claims here about how autonomy platonism can capture important intui-
tions supporting both the eleatic and the indispensabilist. First, the eleatic is correct about 
which existence claims we can infer from scientific theories. Second, the indispensabilist is 
correct about the existence of mathematical objects. Let’s start with the first claim.
An eleatic principle is eminently defensible when applied directly within empirical sci-
ence. It allows us to rid ourselves of centers of mass and infinitely deep water waves as well 
as caloric and ghosts, without presuming that there is some idealized version of science 
that avoids quantifying over them. The eleatic can also explain why the indispensabilist re-
treats to the promise of an ideal theory in such cases. Given the failure of Colyvan’s exam-
ples to find non-causal, non-mathematical quantifications within empirical science, there is 
no reason to reject eleatic principles within science. Even if the indispensabilist rejects the 
eleatic principle as a categorical criterion for determining what to believe exists, it may re-
main a useful rule of thumb in determining which scientific theory is best, as we saw in our 
attitude toward Azzouni’s masses on a spring. There is no real disagreement between the 
eleatic and the indispensabilist in non-mathematical cases; neither believes in centers of 
mass and such.
The autonomy platonist can emphasize the utility of an eleatic principle within em-
pirical science while limiting its scope to such theories. Such a principle can do its work on 
centers of mass and ghosts while we refuse to extend it to formal theories like mathematics. 
23  Among philosophers who have held some version of autonomy platonism historically are Descartes, 
Hume, Frege, and Gödel. More recently, Jerrold Katz, John Burgess, Mark Balaguer, and Mark 
McEvoy have all explored versions of autonomy platonism; see Katz 1998, Burgess 1983, Balaguer 
1998 (Chapters 2-4), and McEvoy 2004. Gödel and Katz appeal explicitly to intuition.
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The inference from the effectiveness of an eleatic principle in identifying our commitments 
in empirical science to the denial of the existence of mathematical objects, one favored by 
A zzouni, for example, denies the independent legitimacy of mathematics. There is no in-
compatibility between an eleatic principle, as a criterion for determining the commitments 
of scientific theory, and mathematical realism, which posits an independent realm of abstract 
objects. The eleatic principle can tell us how to read the claims of empirical science. We can 
appeal to independent reasons, like the consistency, stability, and cogency of mathematical 
theories, to accept mathematical axioms and to believe that mathematical objects exist.
My second claim about the attractiveness of autonomy platonism is that it captures the 
indispensabilist’s claim that mathematical objects exist while denying its implausible alle-
gation that our mathematical beliefs are justified by the same evidence which justifies our 
empirical beliefs. For the indispensabilist, all posits, mathematical and empirical, are on a 
par. Even ordinary objects like trees are posits in exactly the same way that sets are. Like 
logical principles, mathematical beliefs, for the indispensabilist, are connected with our 
other beliefs in such an integral way that abandoning them in response to a contradiction 
in our beliefs or theories forces awkward redistributions of truth values among the remain-
ing components. “If asked why he spares mathematics [in revising his theory in the face of 
recalcitrant experience] the scientist will perhaps say that its laws are necessarily true; but I 
think we have here an explanation, rather, of mathematical necessity itself. It resides in our 
unstated policy of shielding mathematics by exercising our freedom to reject other beliefs 
instead” (Quine 1992: 15).
While it is a simple logical fact that we can hold or cede any claim in a theory by mak-
ing appropriate adjustments elsewhere, the roles of mathematical objects in our theories are 
different from the roles of other kinds of posits. We hold mathematical theorems in the 
background when testing or confirming empirical claims. We do not allow them to be re-
futed in the ways in which we hold other claims open to disconfirmation.24 Mathematical 
and scientific practice belies the indispensabilist’s claims about mathematical justification.
Eleatics and indispensabilists agree that uses of mathematics in scientific theories are 
indispensable in practice. They disagree about whether those uses are ontologically signifi-
cant. The autonomy platonist accepts the indispensabilist’s claim that they are, while agree-
ing with the eleatic that the applications of mathematics within empirical theories are not 
reasons to believe that they are.
The defender of QI looks at a standard scientific theory, with its references to both 
physical and mathematical objects, and sees no principled way of distinguishing them. Let’s 
imagine that the theory contains Coulomb’s law, CL.
CL F = k |q1q2|/ r2 , where the electrostatic constant k ≈ 9 × 109 Nm2/c2
First-order regimentations of CL quantify over both particles (with their charges) and 
real numbers (the electrostatic constant). The indispensabilist claims that to call the refer-
24  Elliott Sober has been making this point for over two decades. “If the mathematical statements M are 
part of every competing hypothesis, then, no matter which hypothesis comes out best in the light of 
the observations, M will be part of that best hypothesis. M is not tested by this exercise, but is simply a 
background assumption common to the hypotheses under test” (Sober 1993: 45). See also Sober 1999 
and Sober 2005.
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ences to real numbers merely instrumental while accepting the existence of the particles is 
to make an arbitrary distinction. The truth conditions for the mathematical axioms of our 
theories are of the same sort as the truth conditions for the other theorems, whether they 
include mathematical references or not. All theorems will be true if and only if the objects 
to which they refer exist and have the properties or relations ascribed to them. The auton-
omy platonist accepts these claims while agreeing with the eleatic that such uses of mathe-
matics are not reasons to believe in mathematical objects.
Mathematical theories are our most secure. Beliefs about mathematics are held more 
firmly and widely than even our best scientific theories. Where scientific theories are sup-
planted and abandoned, replaced by better ones, mathematical theories are supplemented 
and extended. Euclidean geometry persists despite the development of non-Euclidean ge-
ometries and its replacement as the framework geometry for our best physics. Proofs first 
written thousands of years ago remain paradigmatically good mathematics. The core idea 
of QI is to defend a natural, literal, and sincere reading of our scientific theories with no 
double-talk. The autonomy platonist extends this natural and literal reading to mathemati-
cal theories themselves.
Any version of autonomy platonism thus captures core intuitions of both eleaticism 
(except for its rejection of mathematical objects) and QI (except for the inference from the 
applications of mathematical theories to their truth). The autonomy platonist rejects the 
indispensabilist’s claim that our uses of mathematics in science provide reasons to believe 
in mathematical objects but agrees that our references to mathematical objects within sci-
entific theories are robust. So both the indispensabilist and the autonomy platonist avoid 
the double-talk of quantifying over mathematical objects while not believing in them. The 
autonomy platonist cannot be accused, as the eleatic may be, of ostrich nominalism regard-
ing the mathematical elements of our theories.
I believe that autonomy platonism based on either non-empirical (i.e. formal or 
a p riori) evidence or a brute knowledge of consistency is preferable both to nominalism 
based on an eleatic principle and to platonism based on an indispensability argument. Phi-
losophers who are not independently committed to the non-existence of mathematical ob-
jects and who find the relevant motivations for both eleatic and indispensabilist principles 
compelling might want to adopt this third view. Autonomy platonism will not be palata-
ble to many indispensabilists, who are reluctant to admit any non-empirical evidence, or to 
many eleatics, who oppose beliefs in any non-causal, non-spatio-temporal objects. So more 
remains to be said, both in favor of autonomy platonism and against QI and eleaticism. 
Still, the arguments for autonomy platonism are independent of the central goal of this pa-
per which is to show that recent attempts to break the stalemate between the eleatic and 
the indispensabilist leave the debate right where it was.
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